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Combating Trademark Infringement Online:   




Although trademark infringement is not a recent phenomenon, it was not until 
the inception and explosive growth of the Internet marketplace that brand owners 
had to face new, titanic and virtually inexorable infringement challenges.  
Trademark infringement online takes place in various forms—from cybersquatting 
and typosquatting that capitalizes on the goodwill surrounding an existing 
trademark1 to the rampant sale of counterfeit goods in online stores and auction 
houses.2  Trademark holders filed 2884 cybersquatting cases in 2012, covering 
5084 domain names, with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)—
an increase of 4.5% more than cases filed in the previous year.3  The sale of 
counterfeit goods online is constantly rising, and the value of those goods is 
expected to top $1.7 trillion by 2015.4  The lack of a physical sales venue, the 
anonymizing blanket offered to counterfeiters online, the increased international 
supply chains and the production of goods in countries with poor intellectual 
property protection, together with the low-cost communication and worldwide 
reach of the Internet, have made counterfeiting a thriving undertaking and put 
trademark owners’ businesses and reputations at risk.5 
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 1. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012).  Cybersquatting refers to the act of registering, trafficking in 
or using a domain name that contains a trademarked term, with the bad faith intention of selling the 
domain name to the trademark owner at an excessively expensive price.  See Ariane C. Strombom, 
Internet Outlaws:  Knowingly Placing Ads on Parked Domain Names Invokes Contributory Trademark 
Liability, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 319, 322−23 (2013).  Typosquatting refers to the registration 
of a domain name with an intentionally misspelled trademark to generate revenue through recognition of 
the mark, usually by using the domain as a parked site on which the registrar places advertisements.  See 
id. at 323. 
 2. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97−98 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 3. See WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL TO THE WIPO 
ASSEMBLIES 2013, at 7 (2013), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/ 
en/general/1050/wipo_pub_1050_2013.pdf.  Nevertheless, domain name registrations grew by 12% in 
2012, so the increase in cybersquatting cases should be considered in the context of that general 
increase.  See David Goldstein, WIPO Misleads Again on 2012 Cybersquatting Statistics, DOMAIN 
PULSE (Mar. 31, 2013), http://www.domainpulse.com/2013/03/31/wipo-misleads-cybersquatting. 
 4. See U.N. INTERREGIONAL CRIME & JUSTICE RESEARCH INST. & THE INT’L CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, CONFISCATION OF THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME:  A MODERN TOOL FOR DETERRING 
COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY 9 (2013), available at http://staging.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-
Rules/BASCAP/BASCAP-Research/Proceeds-of-crime. 
 5. See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine:  The Divergent 
Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 
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As tracking down individual infringers proved to be both inefficient and nearly 
impossible, brand owners employed secondary liability principles to begin 
targeting intermediaries facilitating the infringements.6  Many cases have zeroed in 
on which party ought to bear the burden of monitoring for infringements, and at 
what point the intermediary’s mediating nature is no longer neutral but conducive 
or willfully blind to such infringements.7  Legal scholarship has responded with 
analysis and reform suggestions to the current secondary liability regimes in the 
United States and around the globe.8  Nearly all appear to embrace one essential 
view:  secondary liability rules must defend rights holders’ interests in better 
protecting their brands from trademark infringement online, but the rules must not 
deter legitimate and productive activities in the Internet marketplace.9  The 
application of this well-accepted view, however, engendered a multiplicity of 
judicial decisions and academic views, all attempting to solve this equilibrium 
conundrum.  In this Symposium, too, speakers homed in on the various means 
through which the delicate balance may be struck.  In fact, as Dr. Annette Kur 
pointed out, the word “balance” has become so hackneyed in this context that 
scholars began referring to it as “the B word.”10 
Indeed, much ink was spilled over the quest for a balanced approach to 
secondary liability that would effectively curb piracy and counterfeiting on the 
Internet without targeting innocent websites or otherwise obstructing the free 
 
1364 (2006).  See also Jillian De Chavez, Building a Trademark Safe Harbor for Contributory 
Counterfeiting Liability After Tiffany v. eBay, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 249, 252 (2012). 
 6. See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 5, at 1364. 
 7. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 163 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
“[i]t is not enough to have general knowledge that some percentage of the purchasers of a product or 
service is using it to engage in infringing activities; rather, the defendant must supply its product or 
service to identified individuals that it knows or has reason to know are engaging in trademark 
infringement”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107 (requiring knowledge of 
specific infringements to establish liability for secondary trademark infringement); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 803 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissing contributory trademark 
infringement claims against Visa, and holding that the mere ability to deter infringement does not 
amount to sufficient “control”); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, 249 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (deciding plaintiff sufficiently alleged defendant specifically knew or was willfully 
blind to infringing activities, and exercised sufficient control since payment services were “necessary 
elements” for transactions of counterfeit goods online).  For a list of various decisions from European 
courts on the issue, see Katja Weckström, Liability for Trademark Infringement for Internet Service 
Providers, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 30 (2012). 
 8. See, e.g., David H. Bernstein & Michael R. Potenza, Why the Reasonable Anticipation 
Standard Is the Reasonable Way to Assess Contributory Trademark Liability in the Online Marketplace, 
2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, 2−3 (2011); Elizabeth K. Levin, A Safe Harbor for Trademark:  
Reevaluating Secondary Trademark Liability After Tiffany v. eBay, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 491, 493 
(2009); Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 5, at 1365−66; Mark P. McKenna, Probabilistic 
Knowledge of Third-Party Trademark Infringement, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10, 2 (2011); Kurt M. 
Saunders & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, The Liability of Online Markets for Counterfeit Goods:  A 
Comparative Analysis of Secondary Trademark Infringement in the United States and Europe, 32 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 37, 41 (2011). 
 9. See, e.g., Bernstein & Potenza, supra note 8. 
 10. Annette Kur, Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop. & Competition Law, 
Address at the Columbia Law School Kernochan Center Symposium:  Who’s Left Holding the [Brand 
Name] Bag?  Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet (Nov. 8, 2013). 
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exchange of ideas.11 Meanwhile, massive trademark infringement regularly takes 
place online, and no panacea is materializing.  In the United States, the Supreme 
Court has yet to provide a precedent to instruct brand owners and intermediaries in 
conducting business online.12  In Europe, secondary liability in trademark cases is 
largely a matter of national law.13  Although the E-Commerce Directive offers a 
safe harbor privilege for a host provider,14 it does not provide an exact definition of 
host provider, and the European Court of Justice left the definition to be determined 
on a case-by-case basis in national courts.15  On the legislative level, attempts to 
pass national and international statutory reforms have generally failed.  In the 
United States, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and Preventing Real Online 
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act (PIPA) were 
shelved indefinitely after an unprecedented public backlash.16  In Europe, 
the divisive Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) was similarly rejected 
by the European Parliament following massive public protests across Europe.17  
The controversial and secretive Trans-Pacific Partnership also seems to attract 
waves of opposition around the world.18 
The current legal landscape does not serve any of the parties in the trademark 
market optimally.  Brand owners suffer massive online infringement and are 
struggling to enforce their rights.  With legislative adaptations being regularly 
 
 11. See, e.g., David H. Bernstein & Michael R. Potenza, supra note 8. 
 12. The only case addressing secondary liability for trademark infringement is Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).  However, the Inwood decision did 
not analyze secondary liability in an online market. 
 13. See Directive 2004/48/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0048R(01):EN:NOT.  Also known as the 
Enforcement Directive, it delegates the conditions and procedures relating to injunctions against 
intermediaries to the national law of the Member States.  See id., pmbl., art. 23. 
 14. See Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the 
Internal Market, art. 14(1), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0031:en:NOT. 
 15. See Joined Cases C-236/08−C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 
2010 E.C.R. I-02417.  See also Kurt M. Saunders & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, The Liability of Online 
Markets for Counterfeit Goods:  A Comparative Analysis of Secondary Trademark Infringement in the 
United States and Europe, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 37, 63 (2011). 
 16. See Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Preventing Real Online Threats 
to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).  For 
a discussion of the public opposition to those bills and its consequences, see Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright 
Lawmaking and Public Choice:  From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
203 (2013). 
 17. See Press Release, European Parliament, European Parliament Rejects ACTA, Apr. 7, 2012, 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20120703IPR48247/html/ 
European-Parliament-rejects-ACTA; see also Erik Kirschbaum & Irina Ivanova, Protests Erupt Across 
Europe Against Web Piracy Treaty, REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/02/11/us-europe-protest-acta-idUSTRE81A0I120120211. 
 18. See Arthur Stamoulis, Transnational Opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, JUSTICE 
RISING 11  (Fall 2013) http://www.thealliancefordemocracy.org/pdf/AfDJR6111.pdf (providing an 
overview of TPP opposition in Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru 
and the United States). 
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impeded and judicial decisions failing to provide clear legal guidance, brand 
holders and Internet intermediaries alike are left in the dark as to the scope of their 
rights and legitimacy of their actions.  In the words of another participant in this 
Symposium, Professor Stacey Dogan, “We know it when we see it.”19  However, 
while the courts may know it when they see it, no one really knows in the 
meantime.  This state of vagueness is well known in another intellectual property 
market:  copyright.  Even though the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) 
shields ISPs from liability by establishing certain safe harbors,20 its practical 
application, and especially what constitutes “actual knowledge,” is highly 
controversial.21 
Against this backdrop, I wish to direct scholarly attention to an additional issue 
that has been virtually overlooked in legal commentary:  cooperation between 
different industries to facilitate private enforcement of intellectual property rights.  
The resort to private ordering to enhance or sustain enforcement is not new—
copyright holders have exercised different forms of self-governance tools to better 
manage their rights and derive benefits from new business opportunities.  Private 
ordering has been used in three classes of interplays:  user-industry relationships 
(e.g., software digital locks and end-user licensing agreements),22 inter-industry 
relationships (e.g., collective rights management organizations and other joint 
ventures),23 and cross-industry relationships (e.g., business partnerships between 
rights holders and broadband providers).24  The last category of private ordering 
has yet to be studied in detail in legal commentary, even though it has far-reaching 
consequences for rights holders, intermediaries and Internet users.25 
In the copyright market, deference to cross-industry partnerships was propelled 
by the rise of digital media and broadband technology that instigated massive 
online infringement of copyrighted works.26  Corporate rights holders fought 
infringement-enabling platforms in the legislative arena by lobbying for statutory 
reform, in the courts by suing intermediaries for secondary copyright infringement 
and in users’ homes through copy-protection technologies and licensing.27  None of 
these tactics, however, was successful in achieving the ultimate goal of reducing 
piracy.  As a result, rights holders began teaming up with intermediaries to either 
 
 19. Stacey L. Dogan, “We Know It When We See It”:  Intermediary Trademark Liability and the 
Internet, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 7, 1 (2011). 
 20. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 21. See Liliana Chang, The Red Flag Test for Apparent Knowledge Under the DMCA § 512(c) 
Safe Harbor, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 196−98 (2010). 
 22. Lev-Aretz, supra note 16, at 249. 
 23. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules:  Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1302−03 (1996) (arguing that repeat players in 
high-transaction-cost industries use private ordering in the form of collective rights organizations to 
effectively substitute their property rights for liability rules). 
 24. Lev-Aretz, supra note 16, at 249−50. 
 25. See id. at 250. 
 26. See Margaret Chon, Sticky Knowledge and Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 177, 202−03 (2011). 
 27. See Jonathan A. Mukai, Joint Ventures and the Online Distribution of Digital Content, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 781, 781 (2005). 
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minimize or monetize infringements.28  The relatively new business partnerships 
were beneficial for rights holders for obvious reasons—copyright owners reduced 
high lobbying and litigation costs, better adapted their business models to new 
infringement-enabling technologies and sometimes even enjoyed new business 
opportunities.29  Intermediaries have opted for such partnerships because they 
prescribe a privately set safe harbor, allow their networks to operate without the 
fear of prospective litigation and may offer additional business advantages.30 
As many of the aforementioned virtues apply in the trademark market as well, 
multi-stakeholder initiatives to better enforce trademark rights have been increasing 
in recent years.  The Center for Safe Internet Pharmacies (“CSIP”)—a nonprofit 
organization devoted to addressing consumer access to illegitimate pharmaceutical 
products online—is an example of such collaboration.31  CSIP’s members include 
American Express, MasterCard, PayPal, Visa, GoDaddy, Google, Facebook, 
Microsoft (Bing), Yahoo! and UPS.  All of these companies allied to root out illicit 
online pharmacies by sharing information about offenders and preventing the sale 
of advertisements to them.32  According to CSIP ex officio member Legitscript, a 
verification and monitoring service for online pharmacies, those efforts have been 
effective, as advertisements for illegitimate drugs and pharmacies have been 
virtually eliminated on major search engines.33  Other examples of cross-industry 
cooperation are the development of voluntary best practices for trademark owners 
and Internet-related companies designed to further the protection of trademarks 
online.34  Payment service providers like American Express and MasterCard, as 
well as Internet platforms like Google, eBay and Yahoo!, contributed their contact 
information for trademark owners to notify them about online sales of 
counterfeits.35 
A more recent set of best practices was created by credit card companies and 
payment processing networks in June 2011, in order to attempt to discontinue 
payment services for online sellers of illegitimate goods.36  To accomplish this 
 
 28. See Lev-Aretz, supra note 16, at 250−52. 
 29. See id. at 252. 
 30. See id. 
 31. CTR. FOR SAFE INTERNET PHARMACIES, http://www.safemedsonline.org/ (last visited Feb. 9, 
2014). 
 32. Members, CTR. FOR SAFE INTERNET PHARMACIES, http://www.safemedsonline.org/who-we-
are/members/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
 33. Our Results, CTR. FOR SAFE INTERNET PHARMACIES, http://www.safemedsonline.org/who-
we-are/our-results/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (“[T]he number of illegal drug and pharmacy ads on major 
search engines like Google and Bing [Microsoft] has declined by more than 99.9% percent since 2010 . . 
. [and] Google alone has removed more than 3 million ads for illegal pharmacies and has made 
thousands of referrals to law enforcement about rogue online pharmacies since 2011.”). 
 34. INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, ADDRESSING THE SALE OF COUNTERFEITS ON THE INTERNET 3 
(2009), available at http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTA%20Best%20Practices%20for 
%20Addressing%20the%20Sale%20of%20Counterfeits%20on%20the%20Internet.pdf. 
 35. Id. 
 36. U.S. INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 36 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/2013-us-ipec-joint-strategic-plan.pdf. 
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agreement’s goals, the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC), a trade 
association representing trademark holders, established the Payment Processor 
Initiative.  The Initiative employs an automated process for brand owners to 
directly report online sellers of counterfeit goods to credit card and payment 
processing services.37  Participating rights holders, the IACC, the National 
Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center and credit card and payment 
processing networks exchange information using this access-controlled portal 
system.38  In addition to analytical tools, the portal system offers brand owners a 
reporting mechanism that delivers disposition results and statistical data.39  Ten 
months after its official launch, the Payment Processor Initiative was hailed as a 
“remarkable success” in an IACC statistical review.40  As of February 2014, over 
8400 websites were referred through IACC’s portal for investigation, resulting in 
termination of more than 2800 individual merchant accounts.41 
In the advertising market, the Association of National Advertisers (“ANA”) and 
the American Association of Advertising Agencies (“4A’s”) introduced a set of 
best practices for brand owners and their agencies designed to discourage 
advertising on infringing websites.42  According to ANA and 4A’s, advertisers 
must have confidence that they are not financially supporting or otherwise 
legitimizing “rogue” sites whose primary or only use or purpose is participating in, 
providing the means for or facilitating infringement.43  In addition to this initiative, 
major advertising networks, including Google, Microsoft and AOL, with the 
support of the White House’s Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Coordinator and the Interactive Advertising Bureau,44 have committed to a set 
of best practices for advertising networks to address piracy and counterfeiting.45  
 
 37. IACC Payment Processor Initiative, INT’L ANTI-COUNTERFEITING COAL., http://www.iacc. 
org/payment-processor-portal.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
 38. Kristina Montanaro, INT’L ANTI-COUNTERFEITING COAL., IACC PAYMENT PROCESSOR 
PORTAL PROGRAM – FIRST YEAR REVIEW 2 (2012), available at http://www.gacg.org/Content/Upload/ 
MemberNewsDocs/October%202012%20Report%20to%20IPEC%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1. 
 41. IACC Payment Processor Initiative, supra note 37. 
 42. ANA, 4A’s Release Statement of Best Practices Addressing Online Piracy and Counterfeiting, 
ASS’N OF NAT’L ADVERTISERS (May 3, 2012), http://www.ana.net/content/show/id/23408. 
 43. Id. 
 44. The Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) is the trade association for ad-supported interactive 
media in the United States.  In addition to its cooperation on the Best Practices and Guidelines for Ad 
Networks to Address Piracy and Counterfeiting, IAB also developed the Quality Assurance Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”).  The updated Guidelines now explicitly include, inter alia, “an option for the lodging of 
Intellectual Property Infringement complaints by rights holders to the IAB, who will then direct the 
complaint to the relevant contact at each company participating in the Guidelines.”  The Role of 
Voluntary Agreements in the U.S. Intellectual Property System:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony 
of Randall Rothenberg, President & CEO, Interactive Advertising Bureau) [hereinafter The Role of 
Voluntary Agreements]. 
 45. WHITE HOUSE, The Best Practices Guidelines for Ad Networks to Address Piracy and 
Counterfeiting, http://2013ippractices.com/bestpracticesguidelinesforadnetworkstoaddresspiracyand 
counterfeiting.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014); see also Victoria Espinel, Coming Together to Combat 
Online Piracy and Counterfeiting, U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT & BUDGET (Jul. 15, 2013, 8:33 AM), 
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Under this set of self-regulatory guidelines, advertising networks will set up and 
maintain policies to end affiliation with illicit websites by prohibiting them from 
participating in an advertisement program.  This approach attempts to reduce these 
websites’ financial incentives by eliminating a main stream of income.46  
Advertising networks further agreed to establish a notice-and-takedown system 
with a “designated agent” to receive notices from brand holders regarding 
illegitimate websites and an investigation procedure for submitted complaints.47 
As the above examples demonstrate, the use of private ordering to bolster 
trademark enforcement through cross-industry cooperation has become prevalent 
and is expected to continue expanding.  Indeed, there are many benefits to this 
growing trend.  Most obviously, it helps rights holders to better protect their brands 
from trademark infringement by favoring an agreement model in lieu of existing 
adversarial alternatives.  Brand holders and intermediaries alike can also reduce the 
high costs associated with lobbying and litigation by resorting to such voluntary 
self-help measures.  Unlike the legislative or regulatory processes, these 
agreements are considerably more flexible, and the contracting parties can modify 
the terms to adapt to technological or business changes.  Moreover, many of these 
initiatives carry meaningful educational value:  once publicly announced, the 
private rules can influence social perceptions and can effectively stigmatize or 
otherwise convey the unlawfulness of the online infringing behavior.  These 
arrangements also provide legal certainty to intermediaries by privately establishing 
a safe harbor under clear rules.  Most importantly, cross-industry collaborations are 
not geographically bound, and can implement (and later change) a cross-border 
online policy more easily and quickly than any public international initiative.48 
Nevertheless, the resort to cross-industry partnerships also raises some 
substantial concerns.  As the SOPA/PIPA episode shows, intellectual property 
legislation can be difficult to pass.  The legislative route has often been made 
unworkable and unappealing by conflicting interests that are difficult to reconcile, a 
lengthy progression that can take years to complete and, with the advent of the 
Internet, the heightened transparency of the enactment process.49  To the extent that 
private, cross-industry collaborations have grown due to the complicated legislative 
process, they serve as a legislative bypass.  This is particularly true in the United 
 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/07/15/coming-together-combat-online-piracy-and-counterfeiting; 
Susan Molinari, Ad Networks Agree on Industry Best Practices to Combat Piracy and Counterfeiting, 
GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Jul. 15, 2013), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2013/07/ad-
networks-agree-on-industry-best.html. 
 46. WHITE HOUSE, The Best Practices Guidelines for Ad Networks to Address Piracy and 
Counterfeiting, http://2013ippractices.com/bestpracticesguidelinesforadnetworkstoaddresspiracyand 
counterfeiting.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
 47. Id. 
 48. For example, the IACC struck a voluntary deal with two major websites in China, Taobao and 
Alibaba.  The details of these agreements, however, are not publically available.  See The Role of 
Voluntary Agreements, supra note 44, at 8. 
 49. At the AIPLA Copyright Law Committee Hearing, Congressman Howard Coble noted the 
causal connection:  “The SOPA debate helped shift the willingness of some parties to more aggressively 
promote best practices we are considering here today.”  Id. at 1. 
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States, where secondary liability for trademark infringement has yet to receive 
statutory recognition and the details of its application are unclear.  Indeed, although 
they are privately initiated, cross-industry partnerships often enjoy effectiveness 
similar to that of public legislation by crossing industry boundaries and affecting a 
great number of market participants.  This public-private mixture, however, may be 
objectionable:  it allows statutory-like arrangements to be implemented freely 
without the accountability, protection or transparency of public legislation.50  
Similarly, the resort to cross-industry initiatives may also contradict democratic 
values when those arrangements are designed around the interests of certain 
concerned actors and do not provide all affected parties with the opportunity to 
influence them.  This argument would apply even more strongly against private 
arrangements that are not publicly announced or otherwise made available to the 
public,51 as well as for privately-created laws that result in an industry standard for 
future judicial decisions.52  Given that trademark secondary liability cases often 
involve review of industry practice, those voluntary agreements could become 
industry standards, which could inhibit the growth of other companies in the 
trademark market.53 
There is much more to be said about the growing turn to private ordering to 
effectively enforce brand owners’ rights and to create safe harbors for 
intermediaries.  On top of the social and practical implications of these 
arrangements, their prospects of success, and the trademark regulation they create 
in the shadow of the law, these private deals may also provide a model for public 
lawmaking, if and when secondary liability for trademark infringement receives 
clear and detailed statutory recognition.  Within the purview of this Article, 
however, I merely wish to direct scholarly attention to these engagements, while 
 
 50. When the State actively encourages such a partnership to avoid legislation on a controversial 
issue, the problem is exacerbated.  Some of the cross-industry partnerships described above are the 
result of active encouragement, and in some cases direct involvement, of the U.S. Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC).  See Espinel, supra note 45.  In regard to the active involvement of 
the IPEC in those voluntary agreements, the Electronic Frontier Foundation argues that the 
“encouragement and attention from policymakers carries an implied threat of future regulation if 
‘voluntary’ agreements don’t occur.”  Mitchell Stoltz, Elec. Frontier Found., Comments of the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation on a Voluntary Best Practices Study 1, in U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
COMMENTS REGARDING VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES STUDY (2013), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/officechiefecon/PTO-C-2013-0036.pdf#page=110. 
 51. Robert Barchiesi, President of the IACC, stated that on top of the deals his organization has 
with Taobao and Alibaba, the IACC has also been working with financial companies like PayPal, 
MoneyGram and Western Union.  Id. at 8.  As of this writing, no information about these arrangements 
is publically available.  Furthermore, even those pacts that are publically available suffer from opacity.  
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hoping to lay the groundwork for further legal research and future symposia 
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